






THE OUTBREAK OF THE ALBANIAN‑
‑MACEDONIAN ARMED CONFLICT 
IN 2001 – THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
In the discussion of the armed conflict in Macedonia the economic theory of civ-
il war was used, presented by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner. 
The authors of the theory based their assumptions on a “feasibility hypothesis”, 
that is the possibility of a rebellion, claiming that “where a rebellion is possible, 
it will take place”, with relevant economic factors in place. Once they were ana-
lysed, it became clear that they were very important in the case of Macedonia 
as the economic crisis offered some groups of Albanians reasons for expressing 
their dissatisfaction more radically as well as claims vis à vis the state authori-
ties in Skopje, but also led to corruption, discontinuation of reforms, and illegal 
trade on a large scale.
Key -words: the economy of Macedonia, Albanians in Macedonia, Albanian re-
bellion, 2001 in Macedonia, economic reforms in Macedonia
INTRODUCTION
Inrecent literature dealing with the Albania -Macedonian conflict in Macedonia in 
2001, the authors note the important role of the economic crisis and organized crime 
in the country, which had been impossible to stop in view of the weakness of the state 
structures. Some even suggest that the so -called “new war”1 broke out because of eco-
1 I. Tomovska, ‘Macedonia 2001 and Beyond: New or Old War?’, HUMSEC Journal, No. 2 (2008), 
p. 83.
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nomic reasons.In the literature of the subject such wars are also known as “new -type in-
ternal wars or wild civil wars”.2 One of the newest theories of civil war was presented by 
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner.3 It is an economic theory to which 
some authors refer when discussing the armed conflict in Macedonia.4 The fundamen-
tal difference lies in that this was traditional research based on motivation, whilst the 
theory proposed by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner based on the “feasibility hypothesis”. 
In other words, the modern theory of civil war focuses on the possibility of rebellion 
rather than motivation, stating that “where a rebellion is feasible, it will occur”.5 The au-
thors mention two most obvious material conditions for rebellion: financial and mili-
tary6, indicating three economic factors making the country prone to civil war, namely: 
the level, the dynamics and the structure of income.7 This theory is extraordinarily use-
ful in forecasting the likelihood of a civil war in a given country. The authors of the the-
ory conducted their studies, which covered the years 1966 -2004, taking into account 
various internal armed conflicts in the years 1991 -1992 and 1998 -1999.
The present paper highlights the economic situation of Macedonia in the years of 
its independence (1991 -2000) and show to what extent economic factors were decisive 
for the Albanians to raise an armed rebellion in the north -western part of the country. 
However, the main goal is to establish how this difficult economic situation, resulting 
in corruption, organized crime and highly profitable illicit trade in arms and drugs, 
might have happened. In early 2001, Skopje’s authorities tried to restore order, but it 
ended up with a revolt, of which Albanian politicians took advantage becoming its 
leaders, raising political slogans and calling for independence. In the present paper, the 
financial mobilisation of Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovo, Preševo Valley, Albania and 
the Albanian Diaspora, as well as their military (armed) effort in Macedonia, Kosovo 
and Preševo Valley, without which the revolt would not have been possible, are inten-
tionally omitted with the focus on economic results in the years 1991 -2000.
2 R. Kłosowicz, ‘Państwa upadłe i ich destabilizujący wpływ na stosunki międzynarodowe’ in I. Stawowy-
-Kawka (ed.), Czynniki stabilizacji i destabilizacji w stosunkach międzynarodowych na początku XXI 
wieku. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona Profesorowi Lubomirowi Zyblikiewiczowi, Kraków 2009, p. 388.
3 P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, D. Rohner, Beyond Greed and Grievance. Feasibility and Civil War, Oxford
2008 (The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, 254).
4 N. Papakostos, ‘The Role of Organized Crime in the Eruption, Management and Resolution of the
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in M. Risteska, Z. Daskalovski (eds.), One Decade after the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement: Lessons (to be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience, Skopje 2011, pp. 162-
-193.
5 P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, D. Rohner, Beyond Greed and Grievance…, p. 3.
6 The revolts had sufficient financial resources to wage the war and to organize non -governmental 
armed troops.
7 Developing their feasibility theory Collier, Hoeffler and Rosner also mention other important fea-
tures of the country at major risk of civil war. They include the political factor – whether the country 
was earlier dependent on another state, the demographic factor – the population’s age structure (the 
number of men aged 15 -29) and geographical factors – the mountainous terrain. The length of the 
period of peace was one of the key factors to identify the country’s stability, with the beginning of war 
as the starting point.
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THE YEARS 1991–1994
Macedonia was one of the poorest republics in the Yugoslav Federation. The new gov-
ernment had to tackle many difficulties connected with transforming the system and 
Macedonia entering the path of the market economy. Closures of inefficient state-
-owned enterprises caused a dramatic growth of unemployment, earlier unknown to 
the previously communist country. The government spared no effort to balance the 
budget, pay off foreign debts and reconstruct the banking system. Soon it turned out 
that this challenge was very difficult to meet, and, on top of that, Macedonia faced 
economic isolation. The crisis occurred for many reasons. The country’s close ties with 
the Yugoslav economy broke down. It became apparent that the economy of this young 
country was in a very difficult situation. The country’s economic basis was limited and 
the condition of small industrial businesses was rather poor, similarly to heavy industry 
focused on Yugoslavia’s market. 70% of Macedonian trade relied on the Yugoslavian 
republics, including Serbia (60%). As a result, the international embargo placed on 
Yugoslavia (in which Macedonia was also involved) interrupted contact.8 The situation 
was even more aggravated in the aftermath of the Greek economic blockage.9 In this 
way Macedonia, situated on the crossing of major trade routes,10 found itself entrapped 
between its neighbours. The main transport arteries, motorways (in total 176 km) and 
railway roads (231 km), which ran basically north -south from Belgrade throughSkopje 
to Saloniki, could no longer be used. Economic isolation was a fact.
The demise of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the main economic 
partner of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had an adverse effect on Macedonia’s economy. All economic indicators were very low, 
which showed Macedonia had much to do to catch up. In the years 1991 -1993, the 
official unemployment rate was19%. In reality, it reached 40% because many workers 
employed in production plants did not actually work, and a large number of the unem-
ployed were not registered.11 The unemployed were mostly young people, 80% of them 
seeking their first job. In 1991 the inflation rate reached 115%, skyrocketing to 1,691% 
in 1992. Starting from 3.6% in 1991, the budget deficit tripled in 1992, to reach 13.4% 
in 1993. Arable land constituted only 27% of the country’s area, accounting for 22% 
of the total economic production. The average monthly salary in 1993 was 3,700 de-
8 Sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN continued from mid -1992 till the end of 1995.
9 Greece imposed an embargo in April 1994. It lasted eighteen months.
10 Greece refused access to Thessaloniki.
11 N. Uzunov, ‘Stopanskiot razvoj vo Republika Makedonija vo periodot 1945 -1994 godina’ in ASNOM 
– pedeset godini makedonska država 1944- 1994. Prilozi od naučen sobir održan na 17 -18 noemvri
1994, Skopje 1995, p. 363 gives the number of the officially unemployed in 1990 – 11.8%, whilst 
those without a job – 38.8%. S. Bužar, ‘Geographies of Ethnopolitics: Unravelling the Spatial and
Political Economies of “Ethnic Conflict”’, Issues in South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX). 
European Studies Centre, Occasional Paper, No. 7/06 (2006), p. 16 states that in the Pologregion 
(northwestern Macedonia) the unemployment rate was as high as 49.87%.
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nars, i.e. around 87 US dollars. A large proportion of the local population relied on 
help from their families abroad. This led to mass emigration for economic reasons to 
Western Europe, America and Australia. Around 200,000 people worked abroad out 
of the total population of 2 million.There was only one phone per seven residents, one 
doctor per 454 inhabitants and one dentist per 1,800 people. The average family spent 
44% of its income on food and 11% on clothing. Bread was still the basic product in the 
Macedonians’ diet. The average resident of Macedonia consumed 119 kg of bread per 
year, 89 kg of vegetables and only 31 kg of meat.12
In this very difficult economic situation, with the legacy of the post -communist 
economy based on self -governance, Macedonia made efforts to overcome the severe 
economic crisis and to start reform by transforming its economy. The first steps in 
this direction were taken by Ante Markovic’s government, before the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. But attempts at reform pursued by the Kljusev and Crvenkovski govern-
ments in the years 1991 -1993 in independent Macedonia proved insufficient. On top 
of that, due to the Greek veto, the Republic of Macedonia had no access to interna-
tional institutions.
Table 1. Selected economic indicators in Macedonia in the years 1991-1994  
(GDP and inflation in%, further indicators in% GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
GDP  -6.2  -6.6  -7.5  -1.8
Inflation 115 1 691 350 122
Budget deficit  -3.6  -9.8  -13.4  -2.3
Revenues … 39.3 40.2 43.1
Expenses … 49.1 53.6 45.8
FDI 00 00 00 0.7
Source: ‘FYR Macedonia. Country Economic Memorandum Tackling Unemployment’, Report 
No. 26681 -MK, World Bank, September 2003, p. 15.
THE YEARS 1995‑2000
The recognition of Macedonia and its acceptance as a member of the UN (under the 
name: FYROM) opened its way to the International Monetary Fund (April 1993) and 
the World Bank (December 1993), and therefore the authorities could launch a more 
ambitious programme. The legal basis for privatisation was created in mid -1993, and 
a new programme of stabilization and reform was supported by first World Bank loans 
of USD 40 million. A similar amount was transferred by the Institute of Agriculture 
12 Ch. Chiclet, ‘La Macédoine en 1994 -1995. Un pays déstabilisé’, L’Europe Centrale et Orientale, Vol. 33 
(1996), p. 175.
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Development, whilst the International Monetary Fund and numerous foundations, in-
cluding the SOROS Foundation, granted USD l7 millionof aid to the country. The do-
nors were aware that Macedonia needed urgent aid because social tensions in the face 
of the severe economic crisis were particularly dangerous in that region. Albanian and 
Roma minorities – most severely unemployment – and poverty -stricken – might easily 
have turned an ethnic crisis into a political one. It was estimated that 100,000 families 
lived in poverty. In June 1995, about 132,000 workers of state -owned enterprises had 
not received their salaries for 3 -4 months, whilst others received them irregularly. The 
growing pauperisation of the population led to social unrest.
Despite the difficult economic situation, a constant flow of Albanians to Macedonia 
was seen, chiefly from neighbouring Kosovo. Those who were permanent residents of 
Macedonia earned their living mostly on agriculture, cultivating tobacco, beans, corn 
and wheat – which were the most profitable crops. In the cities they built private motels 
and petrol stations. They also opened private radio and TV stations or printing com-
panies, usually investing the money earned abroad. A large group was in trade, includ-
ing illicit trade. In view of the crisis, economic isolation, i.e. the closing of the borders 
as a result of embargoes, the state tolerated such illegal practices for a long time. Trade 
and smuggling mainly concerned hydrocarbon products, handicraft products, drugs 
and some food products. However, along with food, tobacco, alcohol and petrol, the 
arms trade also flourished. According to official government data, in the years 1992-
-1998, 723 instances of illegal trafficking in arms were discovered and 836 sentenced. 
In the years 1999 -2002, this number grew substantially, by as much as 70%.13 The wars 
in former Yugoslavia created favourable conditions for such practices, sothe arms trade 
turned out to be a profitable source of income.
The work of Natalija Nikolovska and Gordna Siljanovska -Davkova14 provides very 
interesting data on that matter. The authors analyse, inter alia, state budget revenues af-
ter VAT was introduced in the Skopje municipality with a population of 545,000 and 
budget revenues grew from 75.4% in 1999 to 77.7% in 2000. In the Tetov municipality, 
the second -largest in terms of population (172,000 residents), the share dropped from 
2.13% in 1999 to 1.78% in 2000, in the Gostivar municipality from 0.93% in 1999 to 
0.77% in 2000. On the other hand, larger districts with a prevailing Macedonian popu-
lation, e.g. the Bitola community, revenues were twice as high as in Tetov, even though 
the population was three times smaller.15 In order to demonstrate the “crisis of laws” af-
fecting western Macedonia, the authors also used another example. The rate of building 
residential houses in western Macedonia was at its highest just before the outbreak of the 
conflict in 2001. In 1999, in Skopje, 345 residential houses were builtin Tetov, in Gostivar 
187, in Struda 142, whilst in central and western Macedonia, respectively: 51 in Bitola, 
13 Bela kniga na vladata 1998 -2002. Republički izboren štab na VMRO -DPMNE i Liberalna Partija, 
Skopje 2002, p. 33.
14 N. Nikolovska, G. Siljanovska -Davkova, Makedonskata tranzicija vo defekt. Od unitarna kon binacio-
nalna država, Skopja 2001.
15 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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79 in Prilep, 77 in Štip and 34 in Veles. In the year of the Kosovo crisis, in some very small 
(rural) municipalities, e.g. Zajas (population: 2,106) 36 residential houses were built, in 
Aračinov (population: 9,912) 38 houses and in Velešta (6,419 residents) 52 houses.16 The 
above data show that the Velešta municipality, 15 times smaller than Bitola, experienced 
a great boom. Referring to other statistical data, the authors proved beyond doubt that 
any traces of the economic crisis in western Macedonia had long disappeared. This hap-
pened because of the international trade in goods that did not go through legal channels. 
As a result of illicit trade, official income per capita in western Macedonia was the lowest, 
whilst expenditures, including investment, reached a very high level.
Not only the Albanians or the Roma, who were the most affected by the eco-
nomic crisis, were involved in illicit trade. The studies show that both Albanian and 
Macedonian elites were corrupt and involved in illicit trade. Hristina Bojadzieva17 
contends that in the1990s corruption in Macedonia was more widespread compared 
with other economies undergoing a period of transformation (the so -called “transition 
economies”) in Eastern and South -Eastern Europe. Economic calculations have shown 
that recession in Macedonia was chiefly due to corruption and a low FDI rate.18 In the 
years 1991 -2002 covered by the study, corruption in the country was reduced by one 
point on a ten -point scale, which was translated into economic growth by 0.41% per 
year. Moreover, every one -percent increase of FDI caused an increase in the income dy-
namics by 0.104%.19 The corruption rate (on a 1 -10 scale, where 10 is the best result, 
no corruption or minimal corruption) in 1999 in Macedonia accounted for 3.3% ac-
cording to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.20 In the first 
years of independence, corruption in the country reached its highest level, with easy 
profit, the disintegration of control structures of the state, such as the judiciary, the po-
lice and legal regulations on combating corruption and the banking system. According 
to the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG of 14th August 2002), corrup-
tion in Macedonia was of an “endemic” nature, whilst the police acted rather “stu-
pidly” in combating it, so it could be suspected that local authorities conspired with 
organised crime.21 BiljanaStojanovska links the growth of corruption and illicit trade 
16 Ibid., p. 53.
17 H. Bojadzieva, ‘Factors of Economic Growth in the Transition Economies of Eastern Europe: 
The Case of Macedonia’, Issues in Political Economy, Vol. 14 (2005), at <http://org.elon.edu/ipe/
Bojadzieva%20final.pdf>, 28 December 2012. The study covered 25 countries that began their inde-
pendent way towards post -communist transformation in the early 1990s.
18 FDI – Foreign Direct Investment.
19 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
20 Corruption Perceptions Index, 1999, Transparency International, at <http://www.marsgroupkenya.
org/pdfs/Oct_07/CPI/Corruption_Perceptions_Index_1999.pdf>, 28 December 2012.
21 ‘Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down’, ICG Balkans Report, No. 
133, Skopje–Brussels, 14 August 2002, at <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/
Macedonia%28Crisisweb%29.pdf>, 28 December 2012; see also ‘Macedonia: Government corruption; 
whether business owners are forced to pay bribes to corrupt officials; ramifications of non -payment’, 
MCD40447.E, UNHCR, at <http://www.unhcr.org/…/country,,IRBC,,MKD,,3f7d4dc87>, 28 
December 2012.
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with the situation in neighbouring Kosovo. The instability in Kosovo spread to former 
Macedonia.22 Not only was anticorruption legislation missing, but the courts were 
largely dependent on the executive power which was also the case when Macedonia 
was still part of Yugoslavia. The judicial system was still unreformed. In addition, cor-
ruption practices were an acceptable form of business activity which was profitable and 
safeguarded individual interests. In her report, Vanja Mihajlova indicates many irreg-
ularities in privatization transactions, namely: the lack of public procurement proce-
dures, understating the company’s value, bribery among state officials. Although the 
Privatization Agency claimed its independence, its staff and Board influenced the proc-
essesof privatization.23
The privatization of state -owned enterprises speeded up at the end of 1994. It cov-
ered as many as 1,200 plants, including 115 large plants employing over 250 work-
ers, around 300 medium -sized enterprises with 150 -250 workers and other smaller en-
terprises, so as a result another group of 15,000 joined the army of the unemployed. 
Zvet Zeqiri wrote about the negative effects of privatization on Albanians, stating that: 
“Selling a company to its managers was considered one of the best methods of privatis-
ing an enterprise, which effectively discriminated against the Albanians. The method 
was a real barrier to involving Albanians in the process of privatisation, because there 
were no Albanian managers who might haveactively participated in this process”.24
The currency reform ran in parallel with privatisation. As early as April 1992 
Macedonia’s authorities issued its own currency – Macedonian denar (360 denars = 
1 MKD). A year later they already had the new Macedonian denar, and the reform 
that was implemented stopped hyperinflation.25 The turn of 1995/1996 was a break-
through in Macedonia’s economy. The situation ceased to decline, and in 1996 GDP 
growth was recorded for the first time (around 1.2%). The GDP per capita in 1995 
amounted to USD 800. The Macedonian denar stabilised at a level of 37 denars = 
DM l. Alongside international aid and the reform policy, the abolition of the Greek 
blockage in October 1995 and of economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia signifi-
cantly contributed to the improvement of the overall economic situation. It is assessed 
that the blockade resulted in the loss of around USD 40 million per month, whilst the 
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia cost USD 2 billion per year.26 Despite the open-
22 Б. Стојаноска, ‘Корупцијата во Македонија. Битка со несоодветни средства’, Евродијалог. 
Списание за европски прашања, No. 15 (2011) at <http://studiorum.org.mk/evrodijalog/15/pdf/
EVRODIJALOG_Br_15_Stojanoska_MAK.pdf>, 28 December 2012.
23 V. Mihajlova, ‘Report on Anti -Corruption Issues in the Republic of Macedonia’, SELDI, 25 October 
2001, at <http://www.seldi.net/indexh.php?id=2020>, 28 December 2012.
24 I. Zeqiri, ‘The Economic Causes and Consequences of the 2001 War and the Consolidation of 
the Economy after the Crisis’ in F. Bieber (ed.), Power Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, Skopje 2008, p. 90.
25 W. Gruber, ‘Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Makedoniens seit 1991’, Österreichische Osthefte, Vol. 40, 
No. 1 -2 (1998), p. 439.
26 F. Abrams (ed.), A Threat to “Stability”. Human Rights Violations in Macedonia, Helsinki–New York 
1996, p. 16, claims the US estimates sanctions imposed on Serbia and Greek embargo cost the Republic 
of Macedonia USD 4 billion.
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ing of borders, illegal business was still growing. It was estimated as much as 40% of the 
population’s income in 1995 was earned on the black market.
Beyond any doubt, privatization was still ranked among the greatest economic 
challenges to the restoration of economic stability in the years that followed. In 1996, 
six hundred more enterprises were privatized. The programme of ownership transfor-
mation foresaw that most industrial plants would be privatized by the end of 1998. 
150 enterprises, including 25 large production plants, still awaited privatization in 
that year. New owners lacked capital and experience to manage such large compa-
nies, and the prospects for direct foreign investment were not very bright. The re-
gion was still considered economically unstable and unable to attract foreign capital. 
Ownership rights and their enforcement had a great impact on the economic results, 
but Macedonia’s situation in this respect was rather unclear in view of the poor condi-
tion of the country’s legal system. It was inefficient and unable to enforce contracts. 
In mid -1997, capital engaged in Macedonia amounted to USD 48 million, i.e. USD 
23 per capita. It was a very low figure for a post -communist country, exceeding only 
theamount of foreign capital involved in Ukraine and Moldavia. New companies, with 
just one or two employees, emerged chiefly in the commerce sector. Another weakness 
of the process of reforms was the low rate of privatization of large farms, as testified 
by the fact that only 43% of them were privatized by the end of 1997. Another major 
challenge was the reform of the banking system, which had been undergoing restruc-
turing since 1996.
Table 2. Selected economic indicators in Macedonia in the years 1995-2000  
(GDP and inflation in%, others in% GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
GDP  -1.1 1.2 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5
Inflation 16 3 4 1 1.0 6.0
Budget deficit  -0.7  -1.4  -0.4  -1.7 0.0 2.5
Revenues 38.3 35.7 34.8 33.3 35.4 36.6
Expenses 39.0 37.1 35.1 35.0 35.4 34.1
FDI 0.2 0.3 0.4 3.3 0.9 4.9
Source: ‘FYR Macedonia. Country Economic Memorandum Tackling Unemployment’, Report No. 
26681 -MK, World Bank, September 2003, p. 16.
Ivana Tomovska27 indicates three reasons for the Albanian rebellion in 2001:
1. disadvantaged situation and poverty,
2. weakness of state institutions,
3. corruption and organised crime.
27 I. Tomovska, ‘Macedonia 2001 and Beyond: New or Old War?’, HUMSEC Journal, No. 2 (2008), 
pp. 83 -84.
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She uses the term new war to define the situation in which criminal groups in the re-
gion take advantage of social problems and the weakness of state institutions and mobi-
lize paramilitary groups to acquire financial profits using violence as a method of con-
solidation of power. By using the Diaspora’s help and propaganda, media, symbols and 
speech,nationalist feelings were revivedand people mobilized to action. “‘New wars’ 
occur in areas of economic stagnation, they are served by a small number of people but 
[…] they lead to the criminalization and disintegration of the society”.28 The author 
suggests that the conflict in Macedonia broke out because criminals wanted to protect 
their interests within a wide network of criminal activities chiefly consisting of illicit 
trafficking in arms, drugs and people (taking advantage of ethnic tensions).29 The au-
thors of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency’s analysis from 
October 2003 stressed that the illegal activities in which the Albanians got involved in 
north -western Macedonia was a decisive factor for the outbreak of the armed conflict 
in 2001: “Taking advantage of the strategically important position of Macedonia, the 
mafia networks based in the north -western parts are in control of very lucrative crimi-
nal activities, such as the smuggling of tobacco and drugs, money laundering and traf-
ficking of humans”.30
The economic situation of Macedonia forced the Albanians to take action and cre-
ate underground organizations connected with their Diaspora in Western Europe. In 
the period of economic chaos after the demise of the communist system, the key factor 
forAlbanian business activity was theirspecial Albanian culture, deeply rooted in their 
traditional, patriarchal clans, where such values as loyalty, honour and strong family 
ties prevented effective penetration by outsiders and fostered the creation of mafia -type 
organizations.
Members of the mafia could enrich themselves by selling high volumes of weap-
ons, petrol and oil, in particular after Albanian arsenals were raided in 1997.31 Misha 
Glenny32 puts forward a similar thesis, stating that criminals were the greatest benefici-
aries of the collapse of Yugoslavia, as under the chaos of war they were able to develop 
their operations throughout the Balkans. The Albanian rebellion which took place 
in Macedonia in 2001, was to provide the Albanians with even greater benefits from 
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 86. The author claims that during the 2001 conflict about 10,000 weaponswere distributed 
among civilians.
30 L.J. Lock, Macedonia. A Conflict Analysis, SIDA, October 2003, at <http://www.sida.se/globalassets/
publications/import/pdf/en/macedonia -a -conflict -analysis.pdf>, 28 December 2012.
31 Ibid.
32 M. Glenny, The Balkans. Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 -1999, New York 1999. In 
his Granta Publications , 1 lis 2012 – 800seminal work the author challenges the thesis that the 
conflict in the Balkans was caused by animosities between the nations living there. However, over 
the centuries they were able to create alliances and cooperate with each other. Thus he reveals an of-
ten catastrophic relationship between Europe and the Balkans, and asks a few disturbing questions 
about western intervention in the region. See also: P. Battersby, J.M. Siracusa, S. Ripiloski, Crime 
Wars. The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence and International Law, Santa Barbara 
2011, pp. 61 -89.
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the illicit trade in tobacco, drugs, arms and women.33 The signing of the border agree-
ment between Yugoslavia and Macedonia in 2001 was tostrictly limit the freedom 
of smuggling and illicit trade. This was a serious concern to the mafia structures cov-
ering north -western Macedonia, southern Kosovo and northern Albania. However, 
this is not the only reason forthe Albanian -Macedonian armed conflict of 2001. Most 
certainly it was the reason why Albanian groups radicalized their attitudes towards 
the Skopje government and incited their compatriots’ dissatisfaction and demanding 
attitude.
The economic problems of Macedonia were not only caused by the hardships of the 
reforms, corruption among the highest authorities and illicit trade, which in the period 
of political transformation aggravated the economic crisis, but also by external factors. 
Macedonia was seen as an example of stability and peace, the only post -Yugoslav re-
public without a bloody conflict, a country which achieved independence by peaceful 
means and was able to safeguard their citizens on its own, a cornerstone of democracy 
and stability in the region. However, as stated by political analysts, the country did not 
receive economic support in its difficult situation.34 The lack of economic stability en-
couraged Albanians (as well as Macedonians and other minorities) to engage in illegal 
activities. According to Henryk J. Sokalski35 “[…] small Macedonia could and should 
have become amodel example of western support for emerging new democracies […] In 
the early nineties, a well -prepared, one -off ‘Marshall plan’ for Macedonia would do”.36 
But aid from the European Union and implementation of economic programmes came 
too late and were insufficient.
In 1996, the European Union became Macedonia’s first economic partner (exports 
35.1%, imports 38.6%), with Yugoslavia ranked second, followed by Slovenia and 
Bulgaria.37 Cooperation with EU Member States resulted in the signing of an econom-
ic agreement in June 1996, loans amounting to ECU 150 million and aid from the 
PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for the Restructuring of their 
Economies)38, and from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
33 Ibid., p. 655.
34 K. Bassuener, The Future of Macedonia. A Balkan Survivor Now Needs Reform Washington 2001, p. 5 
(Special Report (U.S. Institute of Peace), 67).
35 H.J. Sokalski, Odrobina prewencji. Dorobek dyplomacji prewencyjnej ONZ w Macedonii, trans. by 
A. Kozłowski, Warszawa 2007, p. 134. Henryk J. Soklaski served in Polish diplomacy for 25 years and 
in the UN for more than ten years, holding, inter alia, the post of the 2nd Deputy Secretary General.
In the years 1995 -1998, in his capacity as Secretary General Special Representative, he supervised the 
UN forces in Macedonia.
36 Ibid.
37 ‘EIU Country Report 1st quarter 1998: Macedonia, Economic structure’, The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, p. 37, at <http://store.eiu.com/Product,aspx?pid=50000205&gid=1320000332&=99407009
9>, 20 April 2013; see also Nowa Makedonija, 20 September 1996, p. 13.
38 The programme of non -repayable financial aid the EU granted to the countries of Central and 
South -Eastern Europe. Initially it was to cover only Poland and Hungary – hence its name. To beeli-
gible for aid, the country needed to respect the rule of law, human rights, democracy and the market 
economy.
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amounting to ECU 25 million. Despite the ambitions economic reforms, restructur-
ing, and, first of all, privatization, the Macedonian economy was still far from stable. 
Though economic growth continued, it was not until the 1st of December 2000 before 
the Republic of Macedonia could report success in its diplomatic activities, in the form 
of the signing of bilateral trade agreements with Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Turkey 
and Bulgaria.
Table 3. Trade Exchange of the Republic of Macedonia  
with other countries of the region in 200039







Later, agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Albania were signed, 
which was an important fact after 2002. In December 2000, Macedonia was in-
cluded into the EU’s Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilization (CARDS) programme implemented in the years 2001 -2006.
Chart 1. GDP dynamics in the Republic of Macedonia 1991–2001 (in%)
39 Bela kniga…, p. 65.
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However, the improvement of the economic situation at the end of Macedonia’s 
first decade as an independent state was insufficient. Lacking serious support from out-
side, Macedonia saw growing poverty, whilst its citizens more than once engaged in il-
legal activities such as illicit trade or corruption, or else emigrated seeking a job abroad 
in their struggle for survival. This caused instability and mistrust in the state structures, 
and thus also the weakness of the country, of which the Albanians took advantage.
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